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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t has become common in some quarters to conflate human 
rights and the law of war/international humanitarian law.  
Nevertheless, despite the growing convergence of various 
protective trends, significant differences remain.”1 
The purpose of war is to compel human submission through the 
application of violence in the name of state power; the purpose of human 
rights law is to prevent this.2  These conflicting paradigms are on a 
collision course in modern armed conflict, often waged amid civilian 
populations whose support is essential to success in counterinsurgency.3  
The lack of clarity in how these norms interact is confusing, prolongs 
conflict, and diminishes protections for combatants and civilians alike.  
This Article explores the gap between the laws of war and human rights 
in light of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and proposes an 
approach to begin reconciling the two norms. 
The laws of war and human rights have fundamentally different 
origins and historical application.4  Despite this, human rights law has 
trended toward expansive reading of its applicability, including 
                                                 
1 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 240 
(2000) (emphasis added). 
2 Eminent law of war scholar and retired Marine Colonel Hays Parks has contrasted the 
warfighting and law enforcement paradigms in the context of when force may be used, and 
how much force is appropriate.  See W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation 
in Hostilities” Study:  No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 INT’L L. & POL. 769, 
778–80 (2010) (distinguishing the rights of combatants and civilians in peacetime and 
during armed conflict).  As will be discussed below, current U.S. military doctrine draws 
these concepts uncomfortably close together in counterinsurgency warfare.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
ARMY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY 7-5, ¶¶ 7-26 (2006) [hereinafter FM 
3-24], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (“In 
counterinsurgencies, warfighting and policing are dynamically linked.  The moral purpose 
of combat operations is to secure peace.  The moral purpose of policing is to maintain the 
peace.”). 
3 Retired Air Force Officer Bard O’Neill, a professor of international affairs at the 
National War College in Washington, D.C., lectures and writes extensively on 
counterinsurgency type and method.  See BARD E. O’NEILL, INSURGENCY & TERRORISM:  
FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE 110 (2d ed. 2005) (viewing popular support from the 
perspective of the insurgent, and noting that “[o]f all the factors influencing the 
progression of insurgencies, popular support probably receives the most attention in the 
literature and oratory of the participants”). 
4 See, e.g., Meron, supra note 1; see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004). 
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extending human rights obligations into armed conflict.5  This expansion 
is largely accomplished by blurring the distinction between legal 
requirements—concerned with mechanical compliance with rules—and 
policy objectives—focused on thematic adherence to aspirational ideals.  
Pursuing policy objectives, these arguments pass from one system of 
laws into another, crossing a field of argument grounded in “soft law.”6 
Merging the laws of war and human rights carries legal and tactical 
risks in current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.  Those 
operations constitute state practice, an element of customary 
international law, and what is now doctrine may in the future be 
interpreted as law, thereby restricting our warfighting capabilities.  
Increased tactical risk is already evident in the Tactical Directives issued 
by the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”), which restricts 
conduct permitted under the law of war in an effort to minimize civilian 
casualties.7 
As both a superpower and prime state proponent of human rights, 
the United States has a heightened duty to reconcile the conflict between 
the laws of war and human rights.  That reconciliation is a logical 
extension of our duties to civilians and combatants alike, and must 
include two main elements:  The use of inherent executive authority to 
harmonize the expression of the opinio juris in documents related to 
armed conflict,8 and a “minilateral” treaty approach that provides for 
both the security interests of specially-affected states and a critical mass 
of legitimacy to further future treaty practice.9  While the recent 
Executive Order regarding Guantánamo Bay detainees employs 
executive authority,10 its welcome issuance is overshadowed by the 
contemporaneous announcement that the United States would apply the 
                                                 
5 Professors Delahunty and Yoo believe that efforts to press human rights into the law 
of war began with the United Nations (“UN”) Conference on Human Rights in 1968.  
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, What Is the Role of International Human Rights Law in the 
War on Terror?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 803, 817 (2010). 
6 The separation of these two branches of law, and the area through which an argument 
would pass in transiting from one to the other, is depicted in a diagram attached to this 
Article as Appendix A. 
7 See generally Tactical Directives of Generals McKiernan, McChrystal, and Petraeus, at 
apps. B–D. 
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) cmt. c (1987) (noting the term comes from the Latin opinio juris sive necessitatis, a 
practice undertaken by a state out of a sense of legal obligation). 
9 Moisés Naìm, Minilateralism:  The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 
2009/06/18/minilateralism. 
10 Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
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human rights principles,11 which are found in Article 75 of Additional 
Protocol I as a matter of “legal obligation,”12 a pronouncement generating 
as many questions as answers. 
Part II of this Article examines the historical underpinnings and 
evolution of these two branches of public international law.  In Part III, 
the expansion of human rights norms into armed conflict is viewed 
through the lens of counterinsurgency, arguing that current operations 
in Afghanistan have set a baseline of state practice, which may ripen into 
customary law.  Part IV takes note of recent presidential actions, which 
may cement this transference of human rights norms in armed conflict, 
and proposes domestic and international approaches toward reconciling 
these two competing branches of the law. 
II.  THE FRICTION BETWEEN HUMANITY AND HUMANITARIAN 
Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows . . . the killing 
and wounding of innocent human beings not directly 
participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian victims of 
lawful collateral damage.  It also permits certain deprivations 
of personal freedom without convictions in a court of 
law. . . . It permits far-reaching limitations of freedoms of 
expression and assembly.13 
The law that protects in war is the law of war:  the lex specialis of 
armed conflict.14  However, the aspirational language of human rights 
law provides strong temptation to bridge the gap between the laws of 
war and peace, and differing opinions are often drawn sharply on how, 
or whether, to reconcile the laws of war and human rights.15  This 
                                                 
11 Protections in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I are distilled from the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights.  See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AT 865 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY]. 
12 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet:  New Actions on Guantánamo and 
Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (emphasis added),  available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-
namo-and-detainee-policy (“The U.S. Government will therefore choose out of a sense of 
legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 [of Additional Protocol I] as 
applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict . . . .”). 
13 Meron, supra note 1, at 240. 
14 Nancie Prud’homme, Lex Specialis:  Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted 
Relationship?, 40 ISR. L. REV. 356, 367 (2007) (“[L]ex specialis derogat legi generali conveys that 
specific law prevails over general law.”). 
15 Compare Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 501, 548 (2008) (maintaining that “there is no going back to a 
complete separation” of human rights law and the law of armed conflict), and Francoise J. 
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dissonance is compounded by the commonality of some terms to both 
branches of law,16 making it “easy to assume—wrongly—that it is ‘a law 
concerning the protection of human rights in armed conflicts’ [sic].”17  
What was once referred to simply as the law of war became the law of 
armed conflict, and later international humanitarian law (“IHL”), a 
“label [that] has the marked disadvantage of masking the role military 
necessity plays in the law governing armed conflict.”18 
A. Law in War and Peace 
Long before these modern humanitarian ideals were formally 
expressed in the law of war, scholars and clergymen examined the use 
and conduct of war.19  The customs of war became more structured in 
the nineteenth century, first in military orders,20 and later by treaty.21  
                                                                                                             
Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549 (2008) 
(exploring how human rights law applies in armed conflict and concluding, inter alia, that 
additional training and resources will be required for international courts and human 
rights bodies to process what are likely to be difficult cases in an unresolved area of law), 
with Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:  Operationalizing the Law 
of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. L.J. 45, 48 (2010) (arguing for new 
definitions of different types of combatants to make the law easier to apply and 
highlighting Mr. Guiora’s views, as he is a retired Israeli military officer), and Major 
Michelle A. Hansen, Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare:  Halting the Expansion of Human 
Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 194 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (arguing that the United States 
should take a lead position in objecting to the expansion of human rights law into armed 
conflict). 
16 Professor Solis notes that the merger of norms in their terms is, in part, related to the 
perspective of the writer:  “The conflation of LOAC/IHL terminology reflects a desire of 
humanitarian-oriented groups and nongovernmental organizations to avoid phrases like 
‘law of war’ in favor of more pacific terms, perhaps in the hope that battlefield actions may 
someday follow that description.”  GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:  
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 23 (2010).  Given the observation, Dr. Solis’ 
choice of terms for the title of his book is noteworthy in that it incorporates all the 
constituent elements of this argument:  law, armed conflict, humanitarianism, and war.  See 
generally id. 
17 DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20 (“Although the expressions ‘human’ and ‘humanitarian’ 
strike a similar chord, it is essential to resist . . . them as intertwined or interchangeable.”). 
18 See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law:  Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 806 (2010) (briefly summarizing 
the evolution of international humanitarian law, noting that the grafting of the term 
“humanitarian” into the descriptive term for this body of law is largely due to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), and discussing the “trend toward 
according greater weight to the humanitarian features of the law”). 
19 See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 47–48 (2006) (summarizing the work of 
Hugo Grotius and other ancient authors as milestones in the evolution of the “‘just war’” 
theory). 
20 See Parks, supra note 2, at 771 n.6 (recognizing that U.S. Army General Orders No. 100 
art. 22, Apr. 24, 1863 is also known as the “Lieber Code”). 
Pedden: Lex Lacunae:  The Merging Laws of War and Human Rights in Counter
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
808 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
Early agreements in the Hague tradition focused on the means and 
methods of war, whereas later treaties in the Geneva tradition shifted 
focus from regulating process to protecting people.22 
Human rights law is much more recent, emerging with the 
formation of the United Nations (“UN”) after World War II.23  The 
human rights framework focuses on the “freedoms, immunities, and 
benefits which, according to widely accepted contemporary values, 
every human being should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives” 
in peacetime.24  Thus, protecting people from abuses at the hands of their 
own government is the core of human rights law,25 an endeavor less 
focused on the might of states than the rights of citizens: 
[h]uman rights law is designed to operate primarily in 
normal peacetime conditions, and within the framework 
of the legal relationship between a state and its citizens.  
The [LOAC], by contrast, is chiefly concerned with the 
abnormal conditions of armed conflict and the 
relationship between a state and the citizens of its 
adversary, a relationship otherwise based upon power 
rather than law.26 
                                                                                                             
21 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV]; Convention Concerning Bombardment by 
Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, 1 Bevans 681 [hereinafter Hague 
IX]; Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V], cited in INT’L & 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. 
ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 9 (2010) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK]. 
22 See Parks, supra note 2, at 771 (“While Geneva law is concerned with protection of war 
victims . . . Hague law deals in large measure with the conduct of hostilities.”). 
23 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 816 (“[I]n an internationalized form [human 
rights law] can be said to have originated as recently as the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights . . . .”); see OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 43. 
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 701 cmt. a (1987); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 812 n.14 (“‘In fact, Human 
Rights represent the most generous principles in humanitarian law, whose laws of war are 
only one particular and exceptional case, which appears precisely at times when war 
restricts or harms the exercising of human rights.’” (citing JEAN PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 32 (1996)). 
25 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 821 n.87 (“‘[IHRL is] a different sphere.  It is no 
longer a question of protecting man against the evils of war, but against the abuses of the 
State and the vicissitudes of life.’” (alteration in original) (citing JEAN PICTET, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 32 (1966))). 
26 Id. at 812 (alterations in original) (quoting CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL BASIS, IN THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 1, 12 (Dieter Fleck, 2d ed. 2008)).  
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These divergent “historical . . . roots [have] not prevented the 
principle of humanity from becoming the common denominator of both 
systems.”27 
Slow to emerge, human rights law has not been slow to expand.  The 
establishment of the UN in 1945 was followed in short order by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,28 followed by other human 
rights treaties,29 the most controversial of which in the context of armed 
conflict is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).30  Because the ICCPR addresses the deprivation of life and 
liberty—circumstances of unfortunate frequency in war—its application 
in war would have a profound effect on the conduct of hostilities.31  The 
following section will explore the theories which seek to reconcile the 
two systems. 
B. Displacement or Reconciliation? 
While the laws of war and human rights are nested in different 
branches of public international law, the vacuum between the two 
archetypes has drawn elements of each into discussion of the other.  On 
one end of the spectrum, some believe the two paradigms are 
“diametrically opposed,”32 because the law of war permits “a degree of 
                                                 
27 Meron, supra note 1, at 245; see id. (“Current trends point to even greater reliance on 
that principle.”). 
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
29 See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
law/pdf/ccpr.pdf. 
31 The view that the ICCPR applies in armed conflict is gaining favor.  See, e.g., Kenneth 
Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 14 (Brookings Inst., 
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Hoover Inst., Working Paper No. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx 
(discussing “the growing belief that human rights law, and the ICCPR particularly, 
continue to apply in some fashion even during hostilities”). 
32 Compare Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades:  The Logical Limit of Applying 
Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52, 76 
(2010) (observing that the legal standard under the law of war “for depriving someone of 
life is diametrically opposed to the authority of state actors to employ deadly force in a 
peacetime context”), with G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 1979 ACTA 
JURIDICA 193, 205 (1979) (“The attempt to confuse the two regimes of law is insupportable 
in theory and inadequate in practice.  The two regimes are not only distinct but are 
diametrically opposed. . . . At the end of the day, the law of human rights seeks to reflect 
the cohesion and harmony in human society and must, from the nature of things, be a 
different and opposed law to that which seeks to regulate the conduct of hostile 
relationships between states or other organized armed groups . . . .”). 
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overbreadth that is inconsistent with human rights law.”33  That 
overbreadth includes practices that human rights would not 
systematically bear, such as “a willingness to kill people in the pursuit of 
political ends,”34 and also “the infliction of death on enemy personnel 
irrespective of the actual risk they present.”35  Such status-based 
targeting, agnostic to the issue of threat, is faulted by those on the other 
end of the spectrum who suggest that a human rights-based paradigm 
should be required, regardless of what the law of war has historically 
permitted.36 
Attempts to reconcile these two extremes generally fall into one of 
two broad categories:  lex specialis and complementarity.  The United 
States has long held the view that the law of war is not only the lex 
specialis displacing a less particular human rights rule, but the lex specialis 
maximus,37 displacing the entire regime of human rights law on 
commencement of armed conflict.38  This interpretive position was 
forming even as human rights law began emanating from the UN, at a 
time when American sentiment disfavoring human rights treaties was so 
strong that it nearly resulted in an amendment to the Constitution.39  
This interpretive stance endures, and the United States still does not 
                                                 
33 Corn, supra note 32, at 77; see also id. (explaining that human rights law in peacetime 
does not permit the use of force based on status, but rather focuses on conduct and threat 
in determining the legitimacy of any use of force). 
34 Anderson, supra note 31, at 5. 
35 Corn, supra note 32, at 77. 
36 See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 
(2010). 
37 This term, undefined elsewhere, was used by a Department of State official at a recent 
academic conference.  That official spoke in his personal capacity, and on a non-attribution 
basis.  The Author is grateful to use the term, and regrets the inability to accord by-name 
recognition in this case. 
38 See INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & 
SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 189–90 (2010) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR 
DESKBOOK].  Another interpretive maxim, expresio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression 
of one thing means the exclusion of others), also counsels separation of these fields of law.  
See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession:  Can Foreign 
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 283, 292 (2003) (“[T]he canon 
makes the most sense when, as with GATT, the express exceptions are numerous, carefully 
drafted, and detailed.  The case for expresio unius is also stronger when the subject matter of 
the proposed implicit exception was within the contemplation of the drafters.”). 
39 See Louis Henkin, Commentary, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:  The 
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 349 (1995) (noting that the amendment was 
proposed by Ohio’s Senator Bricker, and its purpose was “to bury the so-called Covenant 
on Human Rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever dare to attempt 
its resurrection”).  The measure was defeated by a single vote in the Senate.  See Joel R. 
Paul, The Rule of Law is Not For Everyone, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1046, 1060 (2006) 
(reviewing PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD (2005)). 
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apply the ICCPR extraterritorially,40 and much less in armed conflict.41  
Despite its historical primacy and the support of the United States and 
Israel,42 lex specialis has become the minority view.43 
Complementarity, a less expansive view of the lex specialis theory, 
suggests the laws of war and human rights are not in contradiction, but 
rather are “based on the same principles and values, [and] can influence 
and reinforce each other mutually.”44  Complementarity offers the 
“possibility . . . that IHL prevails where it contains an express provision 
which addresses a similar field to that of a human rights norm.”45  
Practical difficulties with this theory include the strong aversion under 
human rights law to practices that are common and protected in war, 
such as targeted killing and the killing of civilians.46  Also unresolved is 
the question of whether and to what extent states may employ their 
armed forces in coordination with other states with different obligations 
under other treaties.47  Nonetheless, some scholars conclude it is 
                                                 
40 The United States reaffirmed this position in its response to certain recommendations 
from the UN Human Rights Committee.  See, e.g., U.S. Follow-up Report on Implementation of 
ICCPR:  United States Responses to Selected Recommendations of the Human Rights, U.S. DEP’T 
STATE (OCT. 10, 2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112673.htm (“The United 
States takes this opportunity to reaffirm its long-standing position that the Covenant does 
not apply extraterritorially.  States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the Covenant 
only to individuals who are (1) within the territory of a State Party and (2) subject to that 
State Party’s jurisdiction.  The [U.S.] Government’s position on this matter is supported by 
the plain text of Article 2 of the Covenant and is confirmed in the Covenant’s negotiating 
history (travaux preparatoires).”). 
41 See LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 38, at 189–90. 
42 Hampson, supra note 15, at 550. 
43 Rep. of the Study Group of Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 
11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/ 
english/a_cn4_l682.pdf. 
44 Droege, supra note 15, at 521. 
45 Hampson, supra note 15, at 560. 
46 See Anderson, supra note 31, at 14 (analyzing the strategic, moral, and humanitarian 
logic that supports targeted killings); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 
I], reprinted in INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL 
CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 197–231 (2010), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-of-war-documentary-
supplement_2010.pdf (noting that while Article 51(1)–51(3) prohibit intentional targeting of 
civilians “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities,” the 
proportionality test found in Article 51(5)(b) makes express allowance for intentional attacks 
resulting in “incidental loss of civilian life” provided that such loss is not excessive “in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”).  Human rights law 
provides no such advance permission to kill the innocent. 
47 This is the case in Afghanistan, where little has been said about the extraterritorial 
applicability of the human rights norms in effect for other North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (“NATO”) troop-contributing nations who are parties to the European Court 
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“beyond argument that the majority of the international community 
views [the laws of war and human rights] as complementary.”48 
Teleological difficulties associated with the merger of these two 
bodies of law do not, however, imply that human rights have no 
influence in war or that use of some human rights-based terms cannot be 
successful.  An example of effective importation of a widely-known legal 
standard from the human rights law framework into the law of war is 
found in the Standing Rules of Engagement, which authorize use of force 
in self-defense based on “all facts and circumstances known to U.S. 
forces at the time.”49  This use of a law enforcement “totality-of-the-
circumstances” standard on the battlefield is appropriate and serves the 
interests of both paradigms well.50  However, importing even seemingly 
innocuous terms from one framework into the other requires caution, as 
those terms can inadvertently import broader policy considerations.51 
Those policy considerations can be problematic.  As a practical 
matter, the policies at issue in armed conflict are approached by different 
actors in different ways.  States have interests and considerations that 
international organizations do not.  These perspectives are distorted 
further as they enter the competitive dialogue, which invariably 
accompanies formation of treaties, and pass through the gap depicted in 
Appendix A.52 
                                                                                                             
of Human Rights (“ECHR”).  See VINCENT MORELLI & PAUL BELKIN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL33627, NATO IN AFGHANISTAN:  A TEST OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE 11 
(2009) (citing Leo Shane III, NATO Commander Asks Member Nations to Drop Troop Limits, 
STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.stripes.com/news/nato-commander-asks-
member-nations-to-drop-troop-limits-1.55918). 
48 Major J. Jeremy Marsh, Rule 99 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study 
and the Relationship Between the Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law, 
ARMY LAW., May 2009, at 22. 
49 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES, AT ENCL. A, 
¶2e (2005) [hereinafter SROE], reprinted in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 21, 
at 76 (“The determination of whether the use of force against U.S. forces is imminent will 
be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time 
and may be made at any level.  Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or 
instantaneous.”). 
50 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 
51 See Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof:  Viewing 
the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 245–63 (2009) (discussing 
practical implications of importing standards of proof and other legal terms and evidence 
for detention decisions). 
52 Some might argue that this “gap” is not a gap at all.  As discussed further below, 
many believe that the application of human rights law in armed conflict is already clear.  It 
is equally clear that others hold a different view, and those differing views largely regard 
matters of state practice, opinio juris, and advocacy. 
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In general, states argue that the gap between the laws of war and 
human rights is the stuff of policy, and that states are free to do as they 
please to the extent that no express treaty or customary law governs.53  
By contrast, non-sovereign actors—such as international organizations—
argue that the gap between the norms is filled with human rights 
obligations, sometimes even when the express language at issue seems 
contrary.54  Because non-sovereign actors risk nothing in taking such 
expansive readings of the law, the weight accorded to their views must 
be viewed in the proper context.  These non-sovereign actors are the 
subject of the next section. 
C. Confluence of Norms by Non-Sovereign Actors 
Confluence of the law in war and human rights is also found in the 
efforts of inter- and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”).  Two 
prominent yet controversial research efforts undertaken by the ICRC, the 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (“CIHL Study”) and the 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
(“DPH Guidance”) blur distinctions between the two bodies of law.55 
The CIHL Study proved flawed from the outset by presuming 
complementarity and failing to comment on significant criticism of that 
very merger.56  This presumption is highly problematic, given the weight 
                                                 
53 Capt. Brian J. Bill, Human Rights:  Time for Greater Judge Advocate Understanding, ARMY 
LAW., June 2010, at 55–59 (discussing the current and historical U.S. position on application 
of human rights law in armed conflict, and summarizing the UN response to that position 
within the context of the ICCPR). 
54 Id. at 58 (noting that the UN Human Rights Committee has adopted the position that 
the ICCPR applies to persons within a state’s territory or subject to its jurisdiction—the 
disjunctive “and”—despite the terms of Article 2 of the ICCPR, which apply the treaty’s 
protections to persons within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction). 
55 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law:  A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of 
Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 179 (2005), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0860.pdf (summarizing the study’s 
purpose and product); see also INT’L COMM. OF RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0990.pdf. 
56 In scoping the CIHL Study, the authors noted: 
Where relevant, practice under international human rights law has 
been included in the study. This was done because international 
human rights law continues to apply during armed conflicts, as 
indicated by the express terms of the human rights treaties themselves, 
although some provisions may, subject to certain conditions, be 
derogated from in time of public emergency.  The continued 
applicability of human rights law during armed conflict has been 
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domestic and international tribunals will likely accord the ICRC’s work 
when interpreting international obligations.57  The CIHL Study also fails 
to properly distinguish and identify the two essential elements of 
custom:  usus and opinio juris.58  While acknowledging the requirement 
for opinio juris, the CIHL Study’s methodology effectively dismisses it,59 
thereby removing the most articulate and nuanced expression of state 
sovereignty—the privilege of the sovereign to express the will of the 
state.  Combined with the CIHL Study’s excessive reliance on military 
manuals as sources of opinio juris—less indicative of a sense of a state’s 
legal obligation than its policy execution—the methodology of the CIHL 
Study creates a risk that customary international legal obligations may 
be determined by military action alone.60  Bridging the gap between 
                                                                                                             
confirmed on numerous occasions by the treaty bodies that have 
analysed State behaviour, including during armed conflict, and by the 
International Court of Justice . . . . 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55, at xxxvi–xxxvii. 
57 This appears to be part of the ICRC’s purpose in publishing the CIHL Study: 
Knowledge of the rules of customary international law may also be of 
service in a number of situations where reliance on customary 
international law is required.  This is especially relevant for the work 
of courts and international organisations.  Indeed, courts are 
frequently required to apply customary international law.  This is the 
case, for example, for the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia . . . . 
Id. at xxxv–xxxvi (2005). 
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(4) cmt. c (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international 
law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free 
to disregard does not contribute to customary law.”). 
59 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55, at xlvi (“During work on the study it 
proved very difficult and largely theoretical to strictly separate elements of practice and 
[opinio juris].  More often than not, one and the same act reflects [both] . . . . When there is 
sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is generally contained within that practice and, as 
a result, it is not usually necessary to demonstrate separately the existence of an opinio 
juris.”). 
60 See Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, & William J. 
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l 
Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/ 
98860.htm.  Ironically, the Study goes on three pages later to emphasize the vital 
importance of opinio juris by quoting the Continental Shelf Case: 
It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international 
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris 
of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an important 
role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or 
indeed in developing them. 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55, at xlix (quoting Continental Shelf (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29–30 (June 3)). 
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what the law is and what the ICRC believes the law should be,61 the CIHL 
Study distorts the formative method of customary law. 
The ICRC’s DPH Guidance also merges the fields of law in war and 
human rights.62  The DPH Guidance draws its title and subject matter 
from Article 51 of Additional Protocol I (“AP I”),63 which addresses the 
protection of civilians from attack “unless and for such time as they take 
a direct part in hostilities.”64  Despite broad consensus on most issues, 
the members of the panel of civilian and military experts convened to 
formulate the recommendations in the DPH Guidance parted company 
with each other on Recommendation IX of the final report: 
In addition to the restraints imposed by international 
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of 
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions 
that may arise under other applicable branches of 
international law, the kind and degree of force which is 
permissible against persons not entitled to protection 
against direct attack must not exceed what is actually 
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in 
the prevailing circumstances.65 
Careful deconstruction of this language reveals the reason for the 
disagreement:  Despite assertions that the DPH Guidance focused 
exclusively on the law of war,66 Recommendation IX is based on 
graduated use of force derived from human rights law,67 where the use 
of graduated force tailored to specific risk is common in law enforcement 
circles. 
                                                 
61 See Major J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 198 MIL. L. REV. 116 (2008) (discussing one rule 
within the CIHL Study as part of broader critique that the Study states not what the law is, 
but what the ICRC wants it to be). 
62 See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 55. 
63 Additional Protocol I, supra note 46, art. 51(3). 
64 Id. 
65 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 77. 
66 See id. at 11 (“Moreover, although the Interpretive Guidance is concerned with IHL 
only, its conclusions remain without prejudice to an analysis of questions related to direct 
participation in hostilities under other applicable branches of international law, such as 
human rights law . . . .”). 
67 This recommendation deeply divided the panel of experts on whose advice and 
contributions the ICRC so heavily relied in creating the Guidance.  In fact, when Dr. Melzer 
proceeded with the recommendation despite vocal objection from members of the panel, 
many members requested that their names not be associated with the work.  See generally 
Parks, supra note 2 (providing a first-hand account of this disagreement). 
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Similar transference of human rights norms occurs within 
deliberative bodies at the UN, which have commissioned significant 
reports that fail to properly apply the correct body of law.  The UN 
Human Rights Committee has received reports assimilating a 
complementary view of the laws of war and human rights.68  Likewise, 
the UN Human Rights Committee, responsible for monitoring State 
compliance with the ICCPR, has long viewed the interplay between the 
laws of war and human rights as complementary.69  As demonstrated by 
the international and domestic court cases discussed in the next section, 
merging the laws of war and human rights is underway in the judiciary 
as well. 
D. International and Domestic Court Interpretations 
Convergence of the laws of war and human rights is also rising in 
international and American judicial landscapes.  In the Nuclear Weapons 
Case, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held that the protections 
against arbitrary deprivation of the right to life under Article 6 of the 
ICCPR did “not cease in times of war,” except as specifically provided 
for under the treaty.70  The court further noted that the law of war would 
operate as lex specialis in determining whether a deprivation of life is 
arbitrary under the ICCPR.71  However, the court provided little 
meaningful guidance on resolving conflict between the two norms, 
noting that the identified right applies “[i]n principle,”72 and leaving 
aside the vital questions of how, to what extent, and whether other 
provisions of the ICCPR might also reach armed conflict.  The vagueness 
                                                 
68 Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 
29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by PHILIP ALSTON) (“Both IHL and 
human rights law apply in the context of armed conflict; whether a particular killing is 
legal is determined by the applicable lex specialis.  To the extent that IHL does not provide a 
rule, or the rule is unclear and its meaning cannot be ascertained from the guidance offered 
by IHL principles, it is appropriate to draw guidance from human rights law.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
69 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r. for Hum. Rts., General Comment No. 06:  The Right 
to Life (Art. 6) (Apr. 30, 1982), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 
(Symbol)/84ab9690ccd81fc7c12563ed0046fae3?Opendocument (analyzing state obligations 
to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life). 
70 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
240 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case]. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  The resulting confusion means advocates for both broad reading of lex specialis and 
complementarity can cite this case with confidence—still another reason to clarify the law 
in this area. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/4
2012] Lex Lacunae 817 
left some to speculate that, when the more specific of the two, human 
rights law—and not the law of war—might be the lex specialis.73 
The court addressed similar questions in Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“the Wall 
Case”),74 after Israel had denied application of several human rights 
instruments due to ongoing armed conflict in the occupied territory.75  
Here, the ICJ fragmented the application of human rights law in armed 
conflict into three scenarios: 
As regards the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus 
three possible situations:  some rights may be 
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; 
yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law.  In order to answer the question put to 
it, the Court will have to take into consideration both 
these branches of international law, namely human 
rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law.76 
Other than reaffirming its position in the Nuclear Weapons Case, the ICJ 
opinion in the Wall Case did little to clarify the issue in a meaningful 
way.77  Rather, the Wall Case identified an already-plain practical overlap 
between the two paradigms that the law has yet to reconcile. 
This permissive but unstructured judicial approach to reconciling 
human rights norms in cases before international courts made it 
inevitable that similar problems would migrate into U.S. courts.78  
                                                 
73 Nancie Prud’homme puts it this way: 
[I]nternational humanitarian law and international human rights law 
could both be either the lex specialis or lex generalis, depending on the 
situation at hand.  Practically speaking, lex specialis and lex generalis 
would be interpreted or applied in such a way that, for instance, 
human rights law would prevail over humanitarian law as regard to 
judicial guarantees. 
Prud’homme, supra note 14, at 374. 
74 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter the Wall Case]. 
75 Prud’homme, supra note 14, at 377. 
76 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 178. 
77 See Prud’homme, supra note 14, at 378. 
78 The bedrock documents on which the United States was founded—the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution—are human rights documents with international reach 
of their own.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 54 (2004) (“The U.S. Constitution served as a principal inspiration and model 
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Detainees captured on the battlefield, or otherwise subject to U.S. efforts 
in the war on terror, have turned to the traditional human rights 
mechanism of the courtroom in droves, bringing cases involving 
targeted killing,79 detention,80 and adjudicative rights.81  In Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens have a right to bring 
habeas corpus petitions to challenge detention that originated during 
armed conflict.82  Two years later, the Court found similar access to the 
courts was required for a Yemeni national who also had been seized in 
combat.83  Again in 2008, the Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that a 
prisoner at Guantánamo Bay had the right to challenge his detention 
through habeas proceedings.84 
These cases are less remarkable for their individual holdings than for 
the general proposition that a human rights framework was used to 
reach boldly (and successfully) into the armed conflict architecture.  The 
outcome of this litigation, on the merits of individual cases and as a 
trend,85 is further indication of the need for nuanced reconciliation of the 
laws of war and human rights.  It seems apparent that a significant body 
of law will emerge from that process.86  However, given that those cases 
are pending before courts accustomed to balancing competing interests 
in a human rights law paradigm, it seems equally apparent that the 
historical tactical concerns in the law of war will be underrepresented. 
“Nature abhors a vacuum, and will act to fill it.”87  But the United 
States stands to lose more than empty space when these competing 
normative frameworks are reconciled with soft law and the advocacy of 
non-sovereign actors whose interests are rooted in advocacy or the 
                                                                                                             
for many foreign and international constitutions and covenants, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”). 
79 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
80 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
81 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
82 542 U.S. 507, 597–99 (2004). 
83 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557. 
84 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
85 See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION:  THE 
GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_c
hesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf (summarizing cases, outcomes, and trends 
in detainee habeas litigation). 
86 See id. at 3 (“The rules the judges craft could have profound implications for decisions 
in the field concerning whether to initially detain, or even target, a given person . . . .”). 
87 BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, ETHICS 15 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed., Andrew Boyle trans., The 
Guernsey Press Co. 1993). 
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academy.88  Ultimately, the influence of human rights law in armed 
conflict shifts more risk onto combat personnel, the result of which will 
invariably include more casualties.89  Nowhere is this pattern more 
evident than in counterinsurgency operations. 
III.  THE CALCULUS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN 
“As long as the rules of the game are observed, it is 
permissible [in armed conflict] to cause suffering, deprivation 
of freedom, and death.”90 
Professor Meron’s pronouncement of law is technically correct but at 
tactical odds with counterinsurgency warfare,91 which closes the gap 
between the laws of war and human rights dramatically at the tactical 
level.  The tempo of convergence is illustrated by the differences between 
tactics employed in Kosovo in the late 1990s, and the conduct of 
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan less than ten years later.92 
Commanders in Kosovo avoided North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(“NATO”) casualties by employing an air campaign conducted at high 
altitude to avoid enemy air defenses.  Operational focus on protecting 
coalition forces, while ultimately effective in compelling Yugoslavia’s 
                                                 
88 See Anderson, supra note 31, at 25–27 (discussing the legal, diplomatic, and practical 
costs of complacency in the face of various pressures applied on the United States’ 
interpretation of legal rights and obligations). 
89 U.S. forces already assume risk in combat as part of the “basic bargain” for those 
engaged in international armed conflict: 
Engage lawfully in combat and, if captured, you will receive the 
comprehensive treatment protections of the Convention.  Ignore the 
laws of war, and you cannot seek the status given to lawful 
combatants.  POW status is perhaps best seen then as an incentive to 
follow the rules in armed conflict.  It also is a way to protect civilians 
more effectively:  [W]hen combatants masquerade as civilians to 
mislead the enemy and avoid detection, civilian suffering increases as 
a tragic consequence of the failure of these combatants to adhere to the 
fundamental law of war principle of distinction between combatants 
and the civilian population. 
John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, Postings on Opinio Juris Blog, STATE.GOV (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2007/116111.htm. 
90 Meron, supra note 1, at 240 (emphasis added). 
91 See FM 3-24, supra note 2 (“Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” 
(citation omitted)). 
92 Paul Robinson, ‘Ready to Kill But Not to Die’:  NATO Strategy in Kosovo, 54 INT’L J. 671, 
672 (1999).  (“The main characteristic of NATO’s conduct of the war in Kosovo was a desire 
to avoid friendly casualties.”). This method was reviled as “a coward’s strategy.”  Id. at 673 
(quoting Gwynne Dwyer, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 11, 1999, at B3). 
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submission to NATO demands,93 was later criticized on grounds that it 
shifts “the war away from military targets and onto civilian ones.”94  
That pendulum has come full swing in Afghanistan, where ground 
troops are the favored method of combat, subject to heavy restrictions in 
the employment of air and artillery assets to avoid civilian casualties.95  
This doctrine shifts risk, much as human rights advocates have 
encouraged, with significant implications for the state practice necessary 
to formation of customary international law. 
A. Human Rights as Military Doctrine 
“We’re attacking to seize control of the population from the 
Taliban.  The people are our objective.”96 
In traditional armed conflict, talk of making civilians “the objective” 
would generate immediate uproar; in counterinsurgency, it is a mantra.97  
Counterinsurgency dominates the doctrinal approach to fighting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.98  Although counterinsurgency itself is nothing new, its 
meteoric rise to prominence in military doctrine in recent years has 
brought about a “radical revolution in warfare” that draws together the 
laws of war and human rights.99  The works of Kilcullen,100 Nagl,101 and 
O’Neill102 all contributed in some measure to the current 
                                                 
93 Id. at 678. 
94 Id. at 681. 
95 See, e.g., apps. B–D (Tactical Directives of Generals McKiernan, McChrystal, and 
Petraeus). 
96 See Obama’s War, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
obamaswar/etc/script.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (emphasis added) (presenting a 
transcript of comments of Lieutenant Colonel Christian Cabaniss, speaking to the Marines 
of 2d Battalion 8th Marines in early July 2009, the night prior to a heliborne assault into 
territory held by the Taliban). 
97 FM 3-24, supra note 2, ¶ 2-4 (“Regaining the populace’s active and continued support 
for the [host nation] government is essential to deprive an insurgency of its power and 
appeal.  The military forces’ primary function in [counterinsurgency] is protecting that 
populace.”). 
98 While the law of war and counterinsurgency are relevant topics to combat operations 
in both of these countries, this Article is focused on applying these principles in 
Afghanistan. 
99 Commander Matthew L. Beran, The Proportionality Balancing Test Revisited:  How 
Counterinsurgency Changes “Military Advantage,” ARMY LAW., Aug. 2010, at 10. 
100 DAVID KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY (2010).   
101 JOHN A. NAGL, COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM:  
LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE (2002).  Mr. Nagl is a retired U.S. Army officer and 
contributed to the Field Manual on counterinsurgency. 
102 O’NEILL, supra note 3. 
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counterinsurgency doctrine of the Army and Marine Corps, which 
devotes an entire chapter to the merger of civilian and military efforts.103 
Those efforts make many traditional human rights issues part and 
parcel of the military mission.104  Current counterinsurgency doctrine 
cites some aspect of human rights normative language nearly twenty 
times:  presuming application of human rights in war,105 assigning 
counterinsurgents to train host nation personnel on interrogation 
techniques,106 and addressing ethics in treatment of detainees.107  This 
doctrine is implemented (and publicized) in Afghanistan through the 
Tactical Directives.  The next section examines that implementation. 
B. Human Rights in the Tactical Directives 
The first Tactical Directive to merge counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan with human rights norms was issued in December 2008, 108 
and identified “[t]he support of the Afghan people for the [Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] and their collective support for 
ISAF [as] critical to defeating the insurgency.”109  The Directive limited 
ISAF searches of Afghan homes, mandated respect for Afghan culture 
and religious practices, required special training and equipment to avoid 
civilian casualties during the escalation of force incidents, and mandated 
investigations of all civilian casualty incidents.110 
                                                 
103 FM 3-24, supra note 2, ¶ 2-2 (“The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial 
to successful COIN operations.  All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and HN 
government.”). 
104 The following issues sound more similar to domestic governance than warfare: 
Counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the 
people’s well-being in all its manifestations.  These include . . .  
• Security from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as 
from nonpolitical violence and crime,  
• Provision for basic economic needs,  
• Provision of essential services, such as water, electricity, 
sanitation, and medical care,  
• Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions, [and]  
• Other aspects that contribute to a society’s basic quality of 
life. 
Id. ¶ 2-6. 
105 Id. ¶ 1-132 (“Any human rights abuses or legal violations committed by U.S. forces 
quickly become known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world.”). 
106 Id. ¶ 6-100 (“[Host nation] personnel should be trained to handle and interrogate 
detainees and prisoners according to internationally recognized human rights norms.”). 
107 Id. ¶ 7-25 (“Soldiers and Marines treat noncombatants and detainees humanely, 
according to American values and internationally recognized human rights standards.”). 
108 See infra McKiernan Tactical Directive, app. B. 
109 Id. at app. B, at B–834. 
110 The implementation of this requirement as doctrine imposes a much heavier standard 
than the customary obligation to investigate war crimes found at Rule 158 of the ICRC 
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On replacing General David McKiernan in May 2009,111 General 
Stanley McChrystal issued a much more restrictive Tactical Directive, 
which further embedded human rights concepts into counterinsurgency 
operations and indexed those norms to legal obligations.112  Describing 
excessive damage and civilian casualties as “strategic defeats,”113 the 
Directive mandates additional scrutiny and limitations on the use of 
close air support on residential compounds, prohibiting the employment 
of these fires except under specified conditions.114  This Directive had a 
significant impact on combat operations in Afghanistan.115  Less than one 
year later, General Petraeus assumed command and continued this 
trend,116 prohibiting certain fires unless “the commander . . . determine[s] 
that no civilians are present.”117 
This momentous shift toward a law enforcement human rights 
paradigm is not solely theoretical:  Restrictions on the employment of 
fires allocates additional risk to the counterinsurgent,118 making combat 
significantly more dangerous than it would be if only the law of war 
                                                                                                             
Study.  See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55, at 607 (identifying a 
requirement under customary law mandating states investigate war crimes committed by 
its nationals, on its territory, or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction). 
111 General McKiernan, “viewed as somewhat cautious and conventionally minded,” was 
replaced less than one year into his tour as Commander of ISAF (“COMISAF”).  Ann Scott 
Tyson, Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan is Fired, COMMON DREAMS (May 12, 2009), 
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/05/12-0.  General McChrystal was 
favored for the Afghan counterinsurgency command due to his extensive Special 
Operations background.  Id. 
112 See infra McChrystal Tactical Directive, app. C, at C–836. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at C-837. 
115 This assertion is based on the Author’s professional experiences as Battalion Judge 
Advocate, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, during combat operations in Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan from May 26 to November 15, 2009.  The Author was personally 
responsible for training Marines on the applicable Tactical Directives.  Some of those 
Marines believed that the requirements of the Tactical Directives in place at the time were 
excessively procedural, and might result in unacceptable delays in delivery of artillery and 
close air support in combat operations, especially in cases involving imminent hostile 
threats.  It merits mention that a single minute exposed to enemy fire is infinitely longer 
than a minute in the safety of one’s own kitchen. 
116 See generally infra Petraeus Tactical Directive, app. D. 
117 Id. at D-840 (emphasis added).  But see Additional Protocol I, supra note 46, at art 
51(5)(b).  Of note, this restriction forecloses a commander’s authority under the law of war 
to balance the loss of civilian lives in light of the concrete and direct military advantage to 
be gained. 
118 U.S. doctrine also recognizes Rules of Engagement such as the Tactical Directives as a 
potential source of combat operational stress, a separate element of delayed risk.  See JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY 
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 60 (2010). 
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applied.119  The driving focus on the protection of that population has 
required counterinsurgent forces to forego latitude offered by the law of 
war and assume more risk for themselves by restricting the use of 
force—both in offensive targeting and in self-defense.120 
This tactical merger of the laws of war and human rights may result 
in “operationalizing” the law in armed conflict,121 but imposing rules 
significantly more stringent than required by the law of war carries a 
separate scheme of risk:  “Tactical goals of reducing or eliminating 
civilian casualties in Afghanistan have led the United States to forego the 
balancing inherent in a proportionality assessment in favor of a mandate 
to protect civilians at all cost.”122  This is precisely the case with the 
Tactical Directives issued by the last three ISAF commanders, and is a 
fundamental shift not just in how we regard the enemy, but in how we 
regard ourselves.  Counterinsurgency has also called into question the 
method by which we calculate advantage in combat—an essential 
element of proportionality.123 
While the proportionality test has never amounted to a simple 
stacking of bodies or benefits on either side of a scale,124 
counterinsurgency’s focus on protection of the local population makes 
even the unintentional killing of a civilian the close companion of defeat.  
Commander Matthew Beran suggests that the nature of 
counterinsurgency essentially doubles the weight to be accorded a 
civilian death.125  While it may be difficult to precisely measure the shift 
in weights on this balance, it is equally important to observe that the 
practice of applying this different method of weighing collateral 
damage—regardless of quantum—may amount to an aspect of state 
practice in the context of customary international law. 
                                                 
119 FM 3-24, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 7-27–7-29. 
120 See Int’l Sec. Assistance Force, ISAF Revises Tactical Directive, NATO (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090706-tactical-directive.html 
(“Protecting Afghan civilians is ISAF’s top priority.  The tactical directive continues the 
long-standing ISAF focus on protecting civilians and operating in a manner that is 
respectful of Afghan culture.”); see also HEADQUARTERS, INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE, 
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN, TACTICAL DIRECTIVE OF July 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf (providing 
tactical guidance and listing the ISAF’s goals).  The versions reproduced at the appendices 
to this Article are those available to the public and are the unclassified summaries of the 
Tactical Directives. 
121 Blank & Guiora, supra note 15, at 48. 
122 Id. at 68. 
123 See Beran, supra note 99, at 10. 
124 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 12. 
125 Beran, supra note 99, at 9. 
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C. Counterinsurgency as Custom 
To ripen into customary international law, a state practice must be 
consistent and anchored in the belief that such practice is what the law 
requires.126  State actions undertaken as policy do not meet this 
standard.127  In this regard, international law is inherently positivist in 
nature—absent an affirmatively identified binding custom or treaty, 
“[r]estrictions upon the independence of [s]tates cannot therefore be 
presumed.”128 
This maxim has been memorialized in the celebrated “Martens 
Clause” of Additional Protocol I, which resolves gaps in the positive 
language of the laws of war by permitting both civilians and combatants 
to resort to custom for guidance.129  The ICRC commentary on this issue 
is helpful: 
In other words, when the Parties to the conflict do not 
clash with a formal prohibition of law of armed conflict, 
they can act freely within the bounds of the principles of 
international law, i.e., they have the benefit of a freedom 
which is not arbitrary but within the framework of law.  
When they come up against a formal prohibition, they 
cannot invoke military necessity to derogate from it.  
When this possibility is explicitly provided for, the 
Parties to the conflict can only invoke it to the extent that 
it is provided for.   
 This principle and these concepts are meant to be 
applied in practice.  This is almost always where the 
                                                 
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) cmt. c (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international 
law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free 
to disregard does not contribute to customary law.”). 
127 Id. 
128 SS. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 44 (Sept. 7).  “International 
law governs relations between independent [s]tates.  The rules of law binding upon [s]tates 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages 
generally accepted as expressing principles of law . . . .”  Id. 
129 The “Martens Clause” is found in Article I, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol I: 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience. 
COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 2. 
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difficulties begin.  It has been argued that the principle is 
clear but the concepts are vague.130 
Current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan are 
establishing affirmative state practice, proving the ability to apply 
normative human rights law concepts on the battlefield.  In addition, the 
Tactical Directives in some cases make reference to a sense of legal 
obligation in doing so.131  Considering the methodology of the CIHL 
Study and the DPH Guidance, the ICRC and others would likely argue 
these operations have already established customary obligations to some 
extent.  This is cause for some concern, given the ICRC’s intent that 
tribunals should weigh its studies in allocating international 
obligation.132 
That is not to say, however, that the point is or should be conceded.  
Counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in Afghanistan may, over time, 
ripen into a set of rules of customary international law.  However, 
current mission requirements should not dictate future mission 
capabilities—the fact that we fight this way now should not require us to 
fight this way forever.133  To clarify the applicable legal framework and 
foreclose current practice from ripening into rules of customary law, the 
United States should take this opportunity to revisit the gaps between 
these norms.  The next section proposes means and methods of doing so. 
IV.  U.S. RESPONSE TO MERGER IN TREATY AND CUSTOM 
“The United States would be best served if the Obama 
Administration did that exceedingly rare thing in 
international law and diplomacy:  Getting the United States 
out in front of the issue by making plain the American 
position, rather than merely reacting in surprise when its 
sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international 
soft-law community.”134 
                                                 
130 See id. at art. 35, ¶¶ 1389–90. 
131 See infra McChrystal Tactical Directive, app. C, at C–836. 
132 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55; see also supra text accompanying 
note 59. 
133 While non-state terrorism remains an imminent threat to national security, it is far 
from certain that all future conflicts will engage this type of enemy.  As the Director of 
National Intelligence has recently indicated, nations with conventional forces remain 
threats as well.  See Eli Lake, China Deemed Biggest Threat to U.S., WASH. TIMES (Mar. 11, 
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/10/china-deemed-biggest-
threat-to-us/?page=all. 
134 Anderson, supra note 31, at 32. 
Pedden: Lex Lacunae:  The Merging Laws of War and Human Rights in Counter
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
826 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
The conceptual merger of the laws of war and human rights may be 
fruitful both in terms of extending the humanitarian objectives of both 
regimes and in clarifying the applicable framework in a meaningful and 
utilitarian way.  As this Article has shown, merging these two systems 
piecemeal carries unacceptable tactical and legal risks.  The best path 
forward includes harmonized employment of domestic law, custom and 
treaty, and reconsideration of the traditional view that multilateralism is 
the sine qua non of legitimacy.135 
A. Minilateralism 
Minilateralism is the practice of “bring[ing] to the table the smallest 
possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact 
on solving a particular problem.”136  Fewer competing interests increases 
negotiation tempo and precludes dilution of the treaty’s purpose, a 
common concern in multilateral negotiations.137  The multilateral 
dilution effect and its tactical consequences are on prominent display 
with the ISAF in Afghanistan,138 where a multitude of Troop 
Contributing Nations (“TCNs”) with varying Rules of Engagement have 
established a practice that is as unwieldy as it is unfair.139  The ISAF 
structure is less representative of sovereign equality than the strategic 
security forming the motivational base for the specially-affected states 
contributing troops. 
                                                 
135 This Article refers to “multilateralism” as a treaty regime that includes a large number 
of states as a party; the more apt term is likely “megalateralism,” referring to large regimes 
organizations such as NATO and the UN. 
136 Naìm, supra note 9. 
137 Other regimes have been discussed in the past to overcome similar differences: 
“[Á] la carte multilateralism” involves coalitions that will vary in size 
and composition depending on the issue at hand, with the only 
constant being that the coalitions are formed and led by the United 
States.  From Washington’s perspective, this approach would seem to 
offer several advantages:  it largely avoids problems of institutional 
blockage, such as those that can occur within the UN Security Council; 
it allows for the limitation of new initiatives to small groups of like-
minded states, with the group then being expanded once momentum 
has been achieved; and it enables the United States to focus its 
persuasive efforts on those most able and willing to assist with respect 
to any given matter. 
Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas:  The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
526, 543–44 (2004) (footnote omitted).  Minilateralism has similar objectives but as a term is 
more descriptive of goals of the approach. 
138 ISAF was formed by a resolution of the UN Security Council in late 2001.  See S.C. Res. 
1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
139 As of March 4, 2011, ISAF currently totals 132,203 troops, of which 90,000 are U.S. 
forces.  Int’l Sec. Assistance Force:  Key Facts and Figures, ISAF, http://www.isaf.nato.int/ 
images/stories/File/Placemats/20100303%20Placemat.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
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Specially-affected states are those, which, by virtue of geography or 
some other factor closely related to the question of law at issue, have a 
heightened interest in the outcome of that question as compared to other 
states.140  This doctrine is recognized by international courts and has 
been asserted by the United States in response to the CIHL study.141  In 
fact, the CIHL Study expressly recognizes the concept of specially-
affected states in its introduction,142 and implicitly recognizes this 
doctrine in the methodology of its conduct of the study.143 
Recent commentary reveals how specially-affected states are 
especially well-suited to be agents of change through the institution of 
successful minilateral regimes: 
The pattern is clear:  Since the early 1990s, the need for 
effective multicountry collaboration has soared, but at 
the same time multilateral talks have inevitably failed; 
deadlines have been missed; financial commitments and 
promises have not been honored; execution has stalled; 
and international collective action has fallen far short of 
what was offered and, more importantly, needed.  These 
failures represent not only the perpetual lack of 
international consensus, but also a flawed obsession 
with multilateralism as the panacea for all the world’s 
ills.144 
                                                 
140 But see MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 13 
(1985) (questioning the doctrine of specially-affected states). 
141 Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 60; see also Anderson, supra note 31, at 32 
(“International law traditionally, after all, accepts that states with particular interests, 
power, and impact in the world, carry more weight in particular matters than other states.  
The American view of maritime law matters more than does landlocked Bolivia’s.  
American views on international security law, as the core global provider of security, 
matter more than do those of Argentina, Germany or, for that matter, NGOs or academic 
commentators.  But it has to speak—and speak loudly—if it wishes to be heard.”). 
142 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55, at xxxix. 
143 The introduction notes the selection method of the states involved in the CIHL Study:  
“On the basis of geographical representation and experience of armed conflict, [certain 
states] were selected for an in-depth study of national practice on international 
humanitarian law by a local expert.”  HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55, at lv.  
That list of states included:  Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic 
of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.  Id.  But see Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 60 
(criticizing the CIHL Study for not properly accounting for specially-affected states). 
144 Naìm, supra note 9. 
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This observation stands in stark contrast to the continued diplomatic 
pursuit of legitimacy through consensus—a “fool’s errand” writ large 
across the current battlefield in Afghanistan.145   Rather than seek broad 
consensus, U.S. policy should focus on achieving a critical mass of 
legitimacy that is lawful and rooted in an operational approach. 
This approach is not without its limitations.  Minilateralism has 
previously been criticized as “a fig leaf for unilateralism.”146  Prudent 
minilateral regimes must therefore build an effective consensus among 
states with clear and legitimate policy objectives.  From the United 
States’ perspective, any minilateral solution must likewise preserve not 
only the inherent right to self-defense under the UN Charter, but must 
also preserve the inherent right to self-defense on which the United 
States has relied in the past.147  As noted academic and scholar Kenneth 
Anderson has explained, past attempts to establish a statutory 
framework for targeted killing “have come and gone without fruition 
with regularity over the decades.”148  There is no reason to believe that 
the establishment of a multilateral solution will be any less politically or 
diplomatically difficult.  It remains a worthy undertaking nonetheless. 
Finally, it merits mention that a minilateral solution (or a multilateral 
one, for that matter) might find acceptance among a body of states who, 
though currently bound to some aspects of the law of war as custom, 
might seek to supersede those obligations by treaty.  Withdrawing from 
customary international law is controversial,149 whereas it is well-
established that states may override customary obligations by executing 
a treaty with contrary provisions.150  In the meantime, the President may 
use inherent constitutional authority to establish a demonstrative 
                                                 
145 Id. 
146 See David Rothkopf, Roll Up Your Pants, Time to Wade Back into “Minilateralism” . . . , 
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 25, 2009), http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/25/ 
roll_up_your_pants_time_to_wade_back_into_minilateralism (“Bush ‘minilateralism’ was 
just a fig leaf for unilateralism, ‘coalitions of the willing’ simply described the small group 
of countries we managed to pull together to help advance U.S. policy to create the illusion 
of something truly multilateral and thus ok in the eyes of the international community.  But 
of course, these coalitions were shallow, half-hearted and had a half-life roughly akin to 
that of a basket of raspberries.  (Which last, mold-free, in my experience here in 
Washington, almost until you get them from the store into your car.”)). 
147 See generally Anderson, supra note 31 (arguing that the use of targeted killings is 
proper in self-defense). 
148 Id. at 34. 
149 Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202, 211 (2010). 
150 Id. at 211 n.34 (“Clearly a treaty, when it first comes into force, overrides customary 
law as between the parties to the treaty . . . .” (quoting PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S 
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (alteration in 
original)). 
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framework for that minilateral regime.  Regrettably, recent executive 
issuances have proceeded both toward and away from a functional 
approach. 
B. Executive Authority and Custom 
While merger of the laws of war and human rights by treaty or 
custom may seem inevitable to some, executive authority provides the 
most responsive means to begin incorporating terms and norms in a way 
best calculated to serve both operational requirements and national 
sovereignty.151  Executive Orders and documents such as the National 
Security Strategy (“NSS”) offer significant opportunity to both command 
the various aspects of the national security instruments and express 
opinio juris as head of state.152 
Executive Orders offer an effective means of direct presidential 
communication on matters of international law.  On his first full day in 
office, President Obama issued three Executive Orders bearing directly 
on the lawfulness of detention policy,153 two of which employed a 
definitions section to invoke, and thereby restrict, their scope to the law 
of war.  The President’s more recent Executive Order directing periodic 
review of detention at Guantánamo both repeats and expands that 
restriction,154 making the Order applicable in cases under review as “law 
of war detention” or those being referred for prosecution.155  
Collectively, these orders express the United States’ view that its 
detention practices are governed by the law of war, but retain the 
possibility of civilian prosecution. 
However, the announcement,156 which accompanied Executive 
Order 13,567, sends a different message that may carry more force under 
international law than the Executive Order itself.  That the President 
                                                 
151 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2667, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Sept. 28, 1945).  The “Truman 
Proclamation” launched a trend of significant extension of coastal state jurisdiction.  See 
MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND COMMENTARY 549–
52 (2d ed. 2001). 
152 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy. 
pdf. 
153 See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (invoking military 
regulations, domestic laws, and treaty provisions under the law of war in imposing 
standards for interrogation); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009) 
(invoking law of war treaties in directing review of cases involving detainees held at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009) 
(establishing an interagency task force to review detention policy options). 
154 See Exec. Order 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
155 Id. § 1. 
156 Fact Sheet, supra note 12. 
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encouraged the Senate to provide its advice and consent to Additional 
Protocol I is no surprise.157  But the distinct language of the 
announcement employs terms of art appear to bind the United States to 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I as a matter of customary international 
law.158  Given that much of this provision is distilled from the ICCPR,159 
the customary application of Article 75 would represent a profound 
departure from the longstanding national policy noted elsewhere in this 
Article, and would significantly expand the nation’s legal obligations.  
The nature and scope of that expansion is uncertain. 
To some extent, the President’s statement that the United States will 
regard Article 75 (and the corresponding portions of the ICCPR) as a 
matter of legal obligation answers the questions of some critics who 
objected that there was “no intelligible principle for determining which 
provisions [of the ICCPR] are incorporated [into the law of war] and 
which are not.”160  It is far from certain that the announcement answers 
those critics in a constructive way, as there remains significant confusion 
on the meaning of these changes.  This announcement has already 
                                                 
157 See John Bellinger, Further Thoughts on the White House Statement About Article 75, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/further-thoughts-on-
the-white-house-statement-about-article-75/ (noting that, despite rejection of the 
remainder of Additional Protocol I on other grounds, it had long been the position of the 
United States that the provisions of Article 75 were sound). 
158 Compare Fact Sheet, supra note 12 (“The U.S. Government will therefore choose out of 
a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 [of Additional 
Protocol I] as applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed 
conflict . . . .”), with  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmt. c (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of 
customary international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense 
of legal obligation . . . .”). 
159 The drafting of Article 75: 
was guided by the work done on Protocol II during the second session 
of the Conference.  Committee III decided to include in Article 65 
(which has become Article 75) the text drawn up for Articles 4 
(Fundamental guarantees) and 6 (Penal prosecutions) of Protocol II, except 
where there was a good reason to change the wording in view of the 
fact that Protocol I deals with international and not non-international 
conflicts.  It should be recalled that Articles 4 (Fundamental guarantees) 
and 6 (Penal prosecutions) of Protocol II reproduce, in some cases word 
for word, the corresponding provisions of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights . . . . 
COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 865, art. 75, ¶ 3005. 
160 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 832.  
Selected provisions of the ICCPR are held to be applicable to situations 
of armed conflict, but no intelligible principle for determining which 
provisions are incorporated and which are not is apparent, and no 
evidence seems to suggest that the state parties to the ICCPR intended 
some, but not others, of its provisions to apply in those circumstances. 
Id. 
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generated vigorous discussion among legal scholars, not all of whom 
agree with this Author’s reading of the President’s remarks.161 
Former legal adviser to the Department of State John Bellinger 
concludes that while the President’s statement accompanying Executive 
Order 13,567 was significant, it did not conclusively establish that Article 
75 now constituted binding customary international law.162  Rather, Mr. 
Bellinger argued that the President has chosen as a matter of policy to 
establish a leadership role in “attempting to create customary 
international law through state practice.”163  Commenting further on the 
matter, Mr. Bellinger maintained his position with respect to the non-
customary nature of Article 75, but encouraged the President to clarify 
the meaning of the statement and whether its language indicates that this 
treaty language from the law of war would apply to detainees currently 
held at Guantánamo because its “ambiguity has confused both the 
[a]dministration’s supporters and critics.”164 
One might argue whether Mr. Bellinger correctly concludes that the 
body of practice is insufficient to establish Article 75 as customary law, 
given 170 states are party and an extensive body of state practice to 
interpret.  However, the President’s statement leaves this and other 
questions unanswered.  What remains abundantly clear is that piecemeal 
incorporation of human rights obligations through Executive Order 
13,567 and the statement that accompanied it have increased confusion, 
even among notable experts, as to which body of law will apply—the 
law of war, or the law of human rights. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The laws of war and human rights do not share the same world 
view, and no amount of fighting—on the battlefield or in the academy—
will change that.  Despite the fundamental differences between their 
                                                 
161 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, My Last Word on Article 75, LAWFARE (Mar. 14, 2011), http: 
//www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/my-last-word-on-article-75/ (summarizing various 
arguments on the precise meaning of the terms used in the Fact Sheet, whether Article 75 is 
applicable to non-international armed conflict, and whether current U.S. practices are 
already in keeping with Article 75). 
162 John Bellinger, Obama’s Announcements on International Law, LAWFARE (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/obamas-announcements-on-international-law/# 
more-1523.  Many in the international community will take issue with Mr. Bellinger’s 
conclusion as to the customary nature of Article 75, given that there are 170 states that are 
party to Additional Protocol I.  See International Humanitarian Law—Treaties & Documents, 
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2011) (providing a list of states that are party to treaties, including Additional 
Protocol I). 
163 Bellinger, supra note 157. 
164 Id. 
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respective fields of application, the two paradigms stand shoulder to 
shoulder in current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.  Such 
close proximity has done much to erode the distinction between the laws 
of war and human rights.  Given that current operations are the stuff of 
which state practice is made, blurring the distinction between the two 
fields is more than merely academic—it carries with it the threat of 
ripening into a matter of binding customary international law. 
Examples of this state practice abound both on the battlefield and the 
home-front.  In combat, military forces apply normative concepts of 
human rights in the execution of missions, and standards for traditional 
law of war decisions now contain terms derived from legal systems, 
which are inextricably rooted in human rights law.  Detainees captured 
on the battlefield petition, not commanders, but domestic civilian 
courts—institutions whose conceptual framework is drawn from human 
rights law.  Likewise, recent pronouncements by the president also 
merge these two fields of law. 
Unfortunately, all of these actors merge the laws of war and human 
rights in different and therefore confusing ways.  As the lead state 
contributor of combat power in the Afghan counterinsurgency, the 
United States has vital security, policy, and international legal interests 
at stake.  Those interests are not well-served permitting the haphazard 
merger of two disparate bodies of law.  Ultimately, it is the warfighters 
and civilians at the tactical level of war who pay the price for this lack of 
clarity. 
To protect those persons and better serve the purpose of existing 
treaties and customary international law, the United States should take a 
leadership role in clarifying the law in those areas in which a merger of 
norms is appropriate, and steadfastly objecting to the imposition of 
human rights norms where the law of war will admit no compromise.  
Our nation’s heroes, and the civilians they are often called upon to 
protect, are well-deserving of law and policy as clear as the dangers they 
face in combat. 
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Appendix A. Public International Law Framework:  Influence and 
Gaps165 
 
                                                 
165 This diagram is derived from a lecture delivered by Colonel William K. Lietzau, 
USMC (Ret.), at the International Humanitarian Law conference hosted by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross at Santa Clara University in January 2011.  Colonel Lietzau 
currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Detainee Policy), and appeared 
at the conference in his capacity as a private citizen.  Accordingly, the diagram represents 
his personal views, and not necessarily those of the United States.  The author is grateful 
for Colonel Leitzau’s permission to incorporate that diagram into this Appendix and 
Article. 
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Appendix B. Tactical Directive—General McKiernan 
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Appendix C. Tactical Directive—General McChrystal 
 
NATO/ISAF UNCLASS 
Headquarters 
International Security Assistance Force 
Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
 
HQ ISAF       6 July 2009 
TO:  See Distribution 
SUBJECT: Tactical Directive 
 
The Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, issued a revised Tactical Directive 
on 02 July 2009.  The Tactical Directive provides guidance and intent for 
the employment of force in support of ISAF operations and updates the 
previous version issued by the previous commander in October 2008.  
This directive also applies to all U.S. forces operating under the control 
of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). 
 
Although the Tactical Directive has been classified for the protection of 
our own forces, portions of the directive are being made public in order 
to ensure a broader awareness of the intent and scope of General 
McChrystal’s guidance to ISAF and USFOR-A forces. 
 
Our strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of 
Afghanistan.  Like any insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and 
will of the population.  Gaining and maintaining that support must be 
our overriding operational imperative—and the ultimate objective of 
every action we take. 
 
What follows are the releasable portions of the Tactical Directive:  
 
We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to 
both defeat the enemy and protect our forces.  But we will not win based 
on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate 
insurgents from the center of gravity—the people.  That means we must 
respect and protect the population from coercion and violence—and 
operate in a manner which will win their support. 
 
This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will 
determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of 
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terrain or attrition of enemy forces.  We must avoid the trap of winning 
tactical victories—but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian 
casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.  
 
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching 
operational issue—clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support 
will be decisive to either side in this struggle.  The Taliban cannot 
militarily defeat us—but we can defeat ourselves. 
 
I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of 
force entails risks to our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk 
wherever possible.  But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated 
population will produce far greater risks.  We must understand this 
reality at every level in our force. 
 
I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like 
close air support (“CAS”) against residential compounds and other 
locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this 
guidance.  Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against the 
cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success 
more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us. 
 
I cannot prescribe the appropriate use of force for every condition that a 
complex battlefield will produce, so I expect our force to internalize and 
operate in accordance with my intent.  Following this intent requires a 
cultural shift within our forces – and complete understanding at every 
level—down to the most junior soldiers.  I expect leaders to ensure this is 
clearly communicated and continually reinforced. 
 
The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential 
compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed 
conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security). 
 
(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the 
lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is 
determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational 
security) are available to effectively counter the threat. 
 
We will not isolate the population from us through our daily conduct or 
execution of combat operations.  Therefore:  
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Any entry into an Afghan house should always be 
accomplished by Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), with the support of local authorities, and 
account for the unique cultural sensitivities toward local 
women. 
 
No ISAF forces will enter or fire upon, or fire into a 
mosque or any religious or historical site except in self-
defense.  All searches and entries for any other reason 
will be conducted by ANSF. 
The challenges in Afghanistan are complex and interrelated, and 
counterinsurgencies are difficult to win.  Nevertheless, we will win this 
war.  I have every confidence in the dedication and competence of the 
members of our force to operate effectively within this challenging 
environment.  Working together with our Afghan partners, we can 
overcome the enemy’s influence and give the Afghan people what they 
deserve:  a country at peace for the first time in three decades, 
foundations of good governance, and economic development. 
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Appendix D. Tactical Directive—General Petraeus 
 
Headquarters 
International Security Assistance Force—Afghanistan 
 
2010-08-CA-004 
 
KABUL, Afghanistan (Aug. 4)—International Security Assistance Force 
Commander, General David Petraeus has issued his updated Tactical 
Directive, providing guidance and intent for the use of force by ISAF and 
USFOR-A units operating in Afghanistan. 
 
The Tactical Directive reinforces the concept of “disciplined use of force” 
in our partnership with Afghan Security Forces to defeat the insurgency 
in Afghanistan. 
 
The updated directive is classified; unclassified portions of the document 
are included below. 
 
“This directive applies to all ISAF and US Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A) forces operating under 
operational or tactical control . . . . Subordinate 
commanders are not authorized to further restrict this 
guidance without my approval. 
 
Our counterinsurgency strategy is achieving progress in 
the face of tough enemies and a number of other 
challenges.  Concentrating our efforts on protecting the 
population is having a significant effect.  We have 
increased security in some key areas, and we have 
reduced the number of civilian casualties caused by 
coalition forces.  
 
The Afghan population is, in a number of areas, 
increasingly supportive of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of coalition forces.  
We have also seen support for the insurgency decrease in 
various areas as the number of insurgent-caused civilian 
casualties has risen dramatically.  We must build on 
this momentum. 
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This effort is a contest of wills.  Our enemies will do all 
that they can to shake our confidence and the confidence 
of the Afghan people.  In turn, we must continue to 
demonstrate our resolve to the enemy.  We will do so 
through our relentless pursuit of the Taliban and others 
who mean Afghanistan harm, through our compassion 
for the Afghan people, and through the example we 
provide to our Afghan partners. 
 
We must continue—indeed, redouble—our efforts to 
reduce the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute 
minimum.  Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our 
cause.  If we use excessive force or operate contrary to 
our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may 
prove to be strategic setbacks. 
 
We must never forget that the center of gravity in this 
struggle is the Afghan people; it is they who will 
ultimately determine the future of Afghanistan . . . . 
 
Prior to the use of fires, the commander approving the 
strike must determine that no civilians are present.  If 
unable to assess the risk of civilian presence, fires are 
prohibited, except under of the following two conditions 
(specific conditions deleted due to operational security; 
however, they have to do with the risk to ISAF and 
Afghan forces). 
 
(NOTE) This directive, as with the previous version, 
does not prevent commanders from protecting the 
lives of their men and women as a matter of self-
defense where it is determined no other options are 
available to effectively counter the threat. 
 
 . . .  Protecting the Afghan people does require killing, 
capturing, or turning the insurgents.  Indeed, as I noted 
earlier, we must pursue the Taliban tenaciously.  But we 
must fight with great discipline and tactical patience. 
We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our 
efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and 
with our obligation to protect our troops.  Our forces 
have been striving to do that, and we will continue to 
do so. 
 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/4
2012] Lex Lacunae 841 
In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a 
moral imperative both to protect Afghan civilians and 
to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women 
in uniform and the Afghan security forces with whom 
we are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder when they are in a 
tough spot. 
 
We must be consistent throughout the force in our 
application of this directive and our rules of 
engagement.  All commanders must reinforce the right 
and obligation of self-defense of coalition forces, of our 
Afghan partners, and of others as authorized by the 
rules of engagement. 
 
We must train our forces to know and understand the 
rules of engagement and the intent of the tactical 
directive.  We must give our troopers the confidence to 
take all necessary actions when it matters most, while 
understanding the strategic consequences of civilian 
casualties.  Indeed, I expect our troopers to exert their 
best judgment according to the situation on the ground.  
Beyond that, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine 
has my full support as we take the fight to the enemy. 
 
 . . .  Partnering is how we operate.  Some civilian 
casualties result from a misunderstanding or ignorance 
of local customs and behaviors.  No individuals are 
more attuned to the Afghan culture than our Afghan 
partners.  Accordingly, it is essential that all operations 
be partnered with an ANSF unit and that our Afghan 
partners be part of the planning and execution phases.  
Their presence will ensure greater situational 
awareness.  It will also serve to alleviate anxiety on the 
part of the local population and build confidence in 
Afghan security forces. 
 
I expect every operation and patrol to be partnered.  If 
there are operational reasons why partnership is not 
possible for a particular operation, the CONOP 
approval authority must be informed . . . .   
 
Partnership is an essential aspect of our 
counterinsurgency strategy.  It is also an indispensible 
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element of the transition of security responsibility to 
ANSF. 
 
Again, we need to build on the momentum we are 
achieving.  I expect every trooper and commander to use 
force judiciously, especially in situations where 
civilians may be present.  At the same time, we must 
employ all assets to ensure our troopers’ safety, keeping 
in mind the importance of protecting the Afghan people 
as we do. 
 
This is a critical challenge at a critical time; but we 
must and will succeed.  I expect that everyone under my 
command, operational and tactical, will not only 
adhere to the letter of this directive, but—more 
importantly—to its intent. 
 
Strategic and operational commanders cannot 
anticipate every engagement.  We have no desire to 
undermine the judgment of tactical commanders.  
However, that judgment should always be guided by my 
intent.  Take the fight to the enemy.  And protect the 
Afghan people and help our Afghan partners defeat the 
insurgency.” 
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